Book VI 6.7.1 oiomenou de autou ta en Persais en eirnuh men ougkeimenh hsucazein, ecein de anakwxhn kai mellhsin tv barbarw proV to palin epagein ton straton, oV apax dialuqeiV ou radiwV hqroizeto ate mh suntetagmenoV mhde sunestwV, all' ocloV mallon h stratoV uparxwn, kai tvn episitimvn autoiV tosoutwn outwn oson an ekastoV afiknoumenoV proV to eautou creivdeV epenegkhtai, kai dusapospastwV te kai dusoknwV kataleipontwn tekna kai gunaikaV kai thn 2. oieian cwran, aifnidiwV aggeloi te kai grammata etaraxe ton 'Alexandron kai eV meizona frontida enebalen, epistelantwn autv tvn empepisteumenwn thn 'IlluridoV hgemonian oti ara Germanoi 'Rhnon kai 'Istron diabainonteV thn 'Rwmaiwn porqousin archn kai ta epi tais ocqaiV stratopeda epikeimena poleiV te kai kwmaV pollh dunamei katatrecousin, eih te ouk en oligw kindunw ta 'Illurika eqnh omorounta kai geitnivnta 'Italia. 3. deisqai toinun thV autou panousiaV kai tou stratou pantoV oV hn sun autv. dhlwqenta dh tauta ton te 'Alexandron etaraxe kai tous ek tou 'Illurikou stratiwtaV eluphse, diplh dokountaV kecrhaqai sumfora, ek te vn peponqesan PersaiV macomenoi, ek te vn peponqesan PersaiV macomenoi, ek te vn epunqanonto touV oikeioV ekastoi upo Germanvn apolwlotaV. hganaktoun oun, kai ton 'Alecandron eicon enaitia aiV ta upo taiV anatolaiV di ameleian h deilian prodedwkota, proV te ta arktva mellonta kai oknounta. 4. hn de kai autv deoV tv 'Alexandrw toiV te aunousi filoiV hdh kai peri authV 'ItaliaV. Ou gar omoion hgounto ton ek Peravn kivdunon oion ton ek Germanvn oi men gar upo taiV anatolaiV katoikounteV, makra gh kai qalatth pollh dihrhmenoi, thn 'Italvn cwran moliV akouousi, ta 'Illurika de eqnh stena onta kai ou pollhn econta thn upo 'RwmaioiV ghn, para tosouton omorouV kai geitonaV poiei GermanouV 'ItaliwtaiV. 5. Epaggellei dh akwn men kai ascallwn thn exodon, plhn thV anagkhV auton kaloushV. Katalipwn te dunamin oshn weto autarkh ruesqai taV 'Rwmaiwn ocqaV, ta te stratopeda kai ta frouria epimelesteron teicisaV kai plhrwsaV ekasta tou wrismenou stratou, autoV eV GermanouV hpeigeto ama tV loipV plhqei. 6. anusaV de thn odon meta pollhV spoudhV epesth taiV tou 'Rhnou scqaiV, kai ta proV ton Germanikon polemon pareskeuaxeto, ton te potamon nausi dielambanen, wn proV allhlaV sundeqeisvn gefurwqenta eumarh thn diabasin toiV stratiwtaiV parexein weto. Megistoi gar dh outoi potamvn up arktw resusi, 'RhnoV te kai 'IstroV, o men GermanouV o de PaionaV paramebwn. oi qerouVmen nausiporon ecousi to reiqron dia baqoV te kai platoV, tou de ceimvnoV pagenteV upo tou kruouV en pediou schmati kaqippeuontai. 7. kruouV en pediou schmati kaqippeuountai. antitupeV de outw kai sterron ginetai to pote reiqron wV mh monon ippwn oplaiV kai posin anqrwpwn antecein, alla kai touV arusasqai qelontaV mh kalpeiV ep auto mhde koila skeuh ferein, pelekeiV de kai dikellaV, in ekkoyanteV gumnon te skeuouV aramenoi to udwr ferusin wsper liqon. 8. fusiV men dh tvn potamvn auth. o de 'Alexandrov MaurousiouV te pleistouV kai toxotvn ariqmon polun epagomenoV apo thV anatolhV 9. h dia polemou kinduneuein. 10. oi mentoi strativtai xalepvV eferon diatribhV te mataiaV egginomenhV, kai mnden ti gennaion h proqumon eV to polemein parecontoV tou 'Alexandrou, all'hnioceiaiV kai trufaiV prosecontoV, deon epexelqein kai timwrhsasqai GermanouV epi toiV protetalmhmenoiV.

Book VI.6.7.1 The emperor calculated that, since Persian affairs were dormant in an unofficial peace, this acted as an obstacle to the barbarian king and caused him to hesitate in making a second invasion with his army. For, if once the Persian disbanded his army, it was difficult to reassemble, because it was not an organized standing force. Being really a horde of men rather than an army, with as much food supplies as each person on arrival brought for his own needs, they were difficult and reluctant to be torn away and leave their wives and families or their own land. 2. But no sooner had Alexander made this calculation than dispatch-carriers and their communiques demoralized him and threw him ina greater state of anxiety. The message from the governors in Illyria was that the Germans were on the march across the Rhine and Danube, devastating the Roman empire, over-running the garrisons on the river banks, and also the cities and villages, with a large force and putting the Illyrians who bordered Italy as neighbors in considerable danger. 3. Therefore, they said, the presence of Alexander and the entire army he had with him was essential. This news dismayed Alexander and caused distress to the soldiers transferred from Illyricum. They felt they had suffered a double tragedy, first in their misfortunes of the Persian war and then in the reports they received individually about the destruction of their families by the Germans. They turned their anger on Alexander, blaming him for his betrayal of their cause in the East through his negligence or cowardice and his hesitant procrastination over the northern crisis. 4. Alexander and the advisers who accompanied him were by this time even concerned about Italy, rating the German menace as very different from the Persians. The inhabitants of the eastern territories, separated as they are by a wide stretch of land and sea, hardly hear about Italy. But the Illyrian provinces are a narrow stretch of land that do not occupy much of Roman territory. This makes the Germans practically adjacent neighbors of the Italians. 5. Reluctantly and sadly (through sheer necessity) Alexander issued the proclamation of an expedition. A force was left behind, sufficiently large, in his opinion, to defend the Roman side of the river; the camps and outposts were given more efficient defences and their full complement of soldiers. The rest of the force Alexander himself took with him and marched against the Germans. 6. After completing the journey at great speed, the emperor reached the banks of the Rhine, where he began to prepare for the German war. The river ws filled with boats, which, when lashed together, he believed would provide the troops with a convenient crossing by way of a bridge. The Rhine and the Danube are the two largest northern rivers, the one bordering Germany and the other Pannonia. In summer their depth and breadth provide a navigable channel, but in winter they are frozen over because of the low temperatures, and are used by horses as though they were firm ground. 7. So hard and solid does the river, at one time a flowing current, now become that it does not just support the weight of horses' hooves and men's feet but, if any one wants to draw water they do not bring water jugs and empty bowls but axes and mattocks to hack it out and carry it home like a stone in their hands without a bowl. 8. So much for the description of the rivers. Alexander had brought with him very many Moroccans and a huge force of archers from the East; the latter came from Osrhoene, though some were Parthian deserters and mercenaries that had enlisted to serve the emperor. This force Alexander began to train to use against the Germans. An army of this kind is particularly harassing to them because the Mauretanians, with their long-range javelin throwing, used their tactics of light-armed attack and withdrawal, and the archers found the Germans' bare heads and large bodies an easy long-distance target for their arrows. If they charged into close combat, they were stubborn fighters and often the equals of the Romans. 9. Such was Alexander's position. He decided, however, to send a mission to the Germans to discuss peace terms, with a promise to meet all their requirements and saying that he had plenty of money. This was the most effective bargaining counter with the Germans, who were avaricious and always ready to trade peace with the Romans in exchange for gold. That was why Alexander attempted to buy terms from them rather than risk the danger of war. 10. But the soldiers bitterly resented this ridiculous waste of time. In their opinion Alexander showed no honorable intention to pursue the war and preferred chariot-racing and a life of easy, when he should have marched out to punish the Germans for their previous insolence. 6.8.1. In the army there was a man called Maximinus, from one of the semi-barbarous tribes of the interior of Thrace. He is reported to have come from a village where he was a shepherd-boy once. As he grew to manhood, he was drafted into the army as a horseman because of his size and strength. Soon, with the help of of a bit of luck, he progressed through all the ranks in the army and was given charge of legions and commands over provinces. 2. Because of this military experience, Alexander put Maximinus in charge of all the recruits to give them military training and turn them out fit for battle. He discharged his trust extremely conscientiously, earning great popularity among the troops because he did not confine himself only to teaching them what to do but also took the lead in all the tasks. As a result they were not just pupils but copied his example of courage. 3. He also won their allegiance still more by awarding them prizes and all kinds of honors. So the young men, of whom the greater majority were Pannonians, admired Maximinus' courage and despised Alexander for being under his mother's control and for the fact that business was conducted on the authority and advice of a woman while he himself presented a picture of negligence and cowardice in his conduct of war. They reminded themselves of the eastern disasters due to his procrastination and how he had shown no sign of bravery or enthusiasm when he came to Germany. 4. On top of their general inclination to revolt, the soldiers found the current state of the empire annoying because of the length of Alexander's rule, and unprofitable now that all his munificence had dried up. But they were optimistic that the near future would be profitable for them and bring desirable honors to the man who unexpectedly benefited. They planned to do away with Alexander and declare Maximinus emperor and Augustus, because he was their fellow soldier and camp-mate, and seemed the ideal choice for the present war with his experience and courage. 5. They gathered in the open, wearing their armor as though for their usual training, and, as Maximinus came forward to supervise them, they threw the purple, imperial cloak over him and proclaimed him emperor, though it is not clear whether Maximinus himself was unaware of what was happening or whether he had planned this secretly. 6. His first reaction was to refuse and throw off the purple cloak, but when they insisted at the point of the sword, threatening to kill him, he preferred to avoid the immediate danger rather than one in the future, and accepted the honor (though the story is that oracles and dreams had frequently in the past predicted such a fortune for him). He addressed his soldiers and advised them that, although he accepted under protest in spite of himself, because he bowed to their desire, they must back up their decisions by action. 7. They must get gold of their arms and quickly overpower Alexander before the news arrived, while he was still in the dark. The object was to overcome his attendant soldiers and his bodyguard, and either persuade them to acquiesce or compel them to do so without difficulty, catching them unprepared by the unexpectedness of the event. 8. To assure his popularity and their enthusiasm, Maximinus doubled their pay, promised an enormous bonus of cash and kind, and cancelled all punishments and marks of disgrace against them. Then he marched them out on their journey. The position of the camp Alexander and his retinue was not far away.