The Hoplites were the heavily armed infantry soldiers of the Greeks. It is thought by many that the name "hoplite" comes from a Greek word "hoplon" for a specific shape (large and round) of shield with a "flat offset rim (itus)" and two handles on the inside, that Paul Cartledge says was invented by 700 B.C. It was usually bronze-rimmed wood. By 425, the Spartan shield generally had a thin sheet of bronze over it. Its size depended on the length of the wearer's forearm.

The shield provided protection, but only for the wearer's front. It was used in close formation fighting with a painted "blazon" that may have been decorative but served to alert fighters to the allegiance of the hoplite. The Spartans had a painted Lambda for Laconia on their shields.

Hoplites wore tunics under other armor that included breastplates, helmets, and greaves.

They carried spears and swords to use in their close style of fighting. Spartan hoplites also wore a short red cloak and long hair.

A child deemed worth raising is given to its mother to be cared for until the age of 7, although during the day, it accompanies its father to the syssitia (dining clubs) where it sits on the floor picking up Spartan customs by osmosis. Lycurgus instituted the practice of appointing a state officer, the paidonomos, who puts children in school, supervises and punishes. Children are barefoot to encourage them to move swiftly, and they are encouraged to learn to withstand the elements by having only one outfit.

Children are never satiated with food or fed fancy dishes.

At the age of 7, the paidonomos organizes the boys into divisions of about 60 each called ilae under the supervision of an eiren aged about 20, at whose house the ilae eats. If the boys want more food, they go on hunts or raids. After dinner, the boys sing songs of war, history, and morality or the eiren quizzes them, training their memory, logic, and ability to speak laconically. It is not clear whether they learn to read. [For more on the issue of literacy in Sparta, see "Cretan Laws and Cretan Literacy," by James Whitley. American Journal of Archaeology, Vol. 101, No. 4. (Oct., 1997), pp. 635-661 and "Literacy in the Spartan Oligarchy," by Paul Cartledge. Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 98, 1978 (1978), pp. 25-37.] The boys play ball games, ride, and swim. They sleep on reeds and suffer floggings -- silently, or they suffer again. Spartans study dance as a kind of gymnastic training for war dances as for wrestling. This was so central that Sparta was known as a dancing place from Homeric times. [For more on the importance of dancing in Sparta, see "Dionysiac Elements in Spartan Cult Dances," by Soteroula Constantinidou. Phoenix, Vol. 52, No. 1/2. (Spring - Summer, 1998), pp. 15-30. ]

Not only were the schools for the sons of the Spartiate, but also for foster sons. Xenophon, for instance, sent his two sons to Sparta for their education. Such students were called trophimoi. Even the sons of helots and perioikoi could be admitted, as syntrophoi or mothakes, but only if a Spartiate adopted them and paid their dues. If these did exceptionally well, they might later be enfranchised as Spartiates. Harley speculates that guilt may be a factor here because the helots and perioikoi often took in the children that the Spartiates had rejected at birth as unworthy of rearing.

At 16 the young men leave the agoge and join the syssitia, although they continue training so they can join the youth who become members of the Krypteia (Cryptia).

Krypteia

Passage from Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus:

"Hitherto I, for my part, see no sign of injustice or want of equity in the laws of Lycurgus, though some who admit them to be well contrived to make good soldiers, pronounce them defective in point of justice. The Cryptia, perhaps (if it were one of Lycurgus's ordinances, as Aristotle says it was), Gave both him and Plato, too, this opinion alike of the lawgiver and his government. By this ordinance, the magistrates dispatched privately some of the ablest of the young men into the country, from time to time, armed only with their daggers, and taking a little necessary provision with them; in the daytime, they hid themselves in out-of-the-way places, and there lay close, but, in the night, issued out into the highways, and killed all the Helots they could light upon; sometimes they set upon them by day, as they were at work in the fields, and murdered them. As, also, Thucydides, in his history of the Peloponnesian war, tells us, that a good number of them, after being singled out for their bravery by the Spartans, garlanded, as enfranchised persons, and led about to all the temples in token of honors, shortly after disappeared all of a sudden, being about the number of two thousand; and no man either then or since could give an account how they came by their deaths. And Aristotle, in particular, adds, that the ephori, so soon as they were entered into their office, used to declare war against them, that they might be massacred without a breach of religion."

Greek warfare displayed the honesty of two armies facing each other head on in broad daylight. The phalanx formation called for each man to trust his neighboring infantryman, often times a friend or relative. With a shield in his left hand and a spear in his right, each man depended on his fellow hoplite's shield for full body coverage. Battles were won and lost depending on the phalanx's ability to hold its formation. Lined shoulder to shoulder with approximately sixty-five pounds of armor, limited vision and hearing, a hoplite's crucial duties required little tactical skill, only to push forward and keep the line together. Outstanding valor rose from a man's ability to keep his nerve amidst such confusion and brutality. In a time when the outcome of battles rested on fellow soldiers’ trust for one another, an individual hoplite's reputation for strength and courage was his greatest asset in keeping his adjacent hoplites bound in a line. The nature of battle for the individual hoplite necessitated trust in one's fellow infantryman for personal and group survival, a tradition that resonates through the history of war, yet exemplified to its finest on the battlefield of Greek antiquity.

The weapons and armor that hoplites brought into battle is telling of the brutality as well as the required physical endurance that defined phalanx warfare. According to Victor Davis Hanson, Classics scholar and professor at California State University in Fresno, estimates of a hoplite’s panoply (his shield, helmet, breastplate, sword, spear, and greaves as seen on the left) weight range from fifty to seventy pounds (Hanson, The Western Way of War 56). A hoplite’s hardwood shield was an integral part of battle. Obviously used for protection against spear and sword thrusts, it also had a bowl shaped curve for one’s shoulder. When the opposing phalanxes met, hoplites in the rear used their shields to push the men in front of them forward. During battle, the shield was carried in the left hand and the spear in the right. This necessitated interdependence among neighboring hoplites; each relied on the man to his right to protect his own vulnerable right side. The solid bronze, Corinthian style helmet (excellent examples of these can be seen at the University of Pennsylvania Museum's Greek Warfare Page) that the average hoplite wore weighed approximately five pounds and covered the head and parts of the face and neck. Because it was not insulated, many men grew beards or long hair, as the Spartans did, in order to provide shock absorbent padding. The solid metal headpieces also provided no ventilation, often times leading to dehydration. The difficulty of wearing the hoplite helmet also gives evidence to the man to dependence found among the phalanx ranks. The burdensome covering allowed for little range of vision and muffled much of the sounds around a man, including any orders from a commander. The isolation in wearing the helmet led to a battle experience largely based on the perception of pressure each man felt from those around him. The hoplite found body protection in his breastplate, a solid bronze, bell-shaped corset weighing thirty to forty pounds. As with the helmet, ventilation was nonexistent, leading to immediate discomfort and a drenching of sweat. Greaves, thin bronze sheets, were employed to protect the lower legs. The weapon of choice in the head on battles of antiquity was a six to eight foot long spear. The wooden shaft was made of ash or cornel wood, the head of iron, and the butt pike of bronze. Upon the collision with the enemy, the spear would often times break, thus the necessity of having a butt end available. However, this arrangement also endangered those hoplites in the rear ranks, for misdirection or accidental backward thrusts of the spear often led to the injury or death of one’s fellow soldier. In the case that the spear was lost or too damaged to use, a short sword was used. This was employed during the hand to hand combat experienced after the initial collision of forces.

The time leading up to battle was a test of nerve. The opposing armies stood face to face, eyeing each other for several minutes to even hours. This was the time of intimidation, when courage was tested with the knowledge of what lie ahead. This was war: brutal, honest, and uncontrollable. The test did not go without physical effects; involuntary defecation and urination, nausea, and light-headedness were not uncommon. Plutarch, a second century Roman biographer, recounts that Aratus, an Achaen general who lived in the third century BC, was prone to such symptoms. His enemies laughed at, “how the general of the Achaeans always had cramps in the bowels when a battle was imminent, and how torpor and dizziness would seize him as soon as the trumpeter stood by to give the signal” (Plutarch, Aratus 29.5) In essence, the standoff was a test of morale amongst the ranks. The interdependence of one man upon another within the phalanx requires unyielding courage. Once battle started, every hoplite had to stand his ground, for one gap could be exploited and lead to defeat. If one man cowered, the rest suffered. In this light, the success of the Spartan army is not surprising. While other city-states wore various styles of panoplies and did not drill together, the Spartan formation was a uniform mass of scarlet cloaks and shining armor (the distinctive Spartan shield and scarlet cloak is seen at the right; here is another image of a Spartan hoplite) . Their unit cohesion stemmed from their lengthy military training and reflected the discipline so crucial to phalanx warfare. Plutarch's description of the advancing Lacemaedonians in the Life of Lycurgus, a ninth century BC Spartan lawgiver who transformed the city-state into the dominant military power of ancient Greece, gives a sense of what an opposing hoplite felt as he stared the intimidating army.

“It was a sight equally and terrifying when they marched in step
with the rhythm of the flute, without any gap in their line of battle,
and with no confusion in their souls, but calmly and cheerfully moving
with the strains of their hymn to their deadly fight.”
(Plutarch, Lycurgus 22.2-3)

Spartan uniformity in marching as well as their distinctive panoplies struck fear in the hearts of their enemies, weakening them before battle ever started.

The march toward the enemy and the initial collision of forces was a balance between momentum and cohesion. The phalanx had to meet its enemy with enough momentum to move forward, but it also had to maintain order within the ranks so not to allow gaps between columns. The importance of unity and cohesion among troops cannot be overemphasized. One weak link in the chain of infantrymen could create a gap that was potentially fatal if exploited. For this reason, the best troops were placed in the front and rear lines of the phalanx. Those in the front needed courage to meet the enemy head on, while those in the back had to have the strength and bearing to maintain a constant push forward once past the initial collision. As the opposing armies marched, breathing became difficult; hearing was virtually impossible except for the overbearing sound of war cries and marching feet. Thousands of feet under the weight of panalopies kicked up dust from the dry summer’s ground. Nerve was everything. The War Songs of Tyrtaeus, a mid seventh century BC elegiac poem written about the Second Messenian War, defines the connection between courage and lack thereof on the battlefield and its influence on victory and defeat.

“Now of those, who dare, abiding one beside another, to advance to the
close fray, and the foremost champions, fewer die, and they save the people
in the rear; but in men that fear, all excellence is lost. No one could ever in
words go through those several ills, which befall a man, if he has been actuated
by cowardice. For ‘tis grievous to wound in the rear the back of a flying man
in hostile war. Shameful too is a corpse lying low in the dust, wounded behind
in the back by the point of a spear.”
(Tyrtaeus, The War Songs of Tyrataeus 2.5-9)

It was those who faltered that contributed to the death of their countrymen. Thus, in the advance, order among men could decide victory and defeat. Speed and fear had to be balanced with the desire to strike the enemy with momentum. If the phalanx went too fast it would become disordered and eventually fall before an enemy's more tightly bound phalanx. On the level of the individual hoplite, fear had to be controlled so not to break the chain of interdependence among troops. The two armies would march slowly toward each other; and at one hundred to one hundred and fifty yards apart, the two masses would start a final trot, prepared for perhaps the most brutal collision of forces (see Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.17) in the history of war.

The massive impact of two seemingly unstoppable phalanxes is thus the essence of war; a strange paradox balancing purity and horror. The hoplites on the front line presumably advanced with their spears carried underhand, aiming for the enemy’s groin and legs. After the initial surge forward came to a standstill, the front three lines would stab their enemy holding the spear overhand, as illustrated on the Chigi vase. At this point, the primary targets were the neck, shoulders, and face. However, if the spear broke (see Xenephon's Hellenica 3.4.14),a short sword was used. Meanwhile, the back five lines pushed forward with their shields. Action following the collision was focused on pushing through breaches in the line created by those hoplite’s engaged in bloody hand to hand combat at the front. Prior to battle, it is evident that hoplites consumed more than their daily ration of wine in hopes of dulling the pain anticipated in possible wounds. The emotions and thoughts of an individual soldier at this time are unimaginable. The sights and sounds of battle offer only a glimpse of the battlefield experience. A cacophony of smashing bronze and breaking wood, the shrieks and moans of men, the continuing war cry; one can only imagine the horrible blood and gore at the front lines. Once into hand to hand combat, breaches were made in lines and a victor was usually apparent.

As a defeated phalanx collapsed, there were two options: flee or retreat in an organized fashion. The latter option was rare but offered a greater chance of survival. However, once it was clear that victory was not one’s side, a mob flight usually ensued. Under the circumstances of phalanx warfare, if one man left it was observed that others would follow or risk being severely weakened if attempting to lead an organized retreat. Once mob flight took over, casualties soared.

“The Lacedaemonians were at no less for men to kill; for the gods gave them such
occupation as they would not have even sought by prayer; for how can it be thought
otherwise than an appointment of the gods, that a multitude of enemies thus
terror-stricken, astounded, exposing their unarmed sides, no one turning to resist, but
all contributing in every way to their own destruction”
(Xenophon, Hellenica 4.4.12)

According to John Lazenby, author of several works on ancient warfare, total annihilation was uncommon in Greek warfare due to limited effectiveness of cavalries. The infantry was not suited to chase down fleeing enemies due to the weight of equipment. At this point in history, not all Greek city-states had cavalries and if they did they were small, therefore the vulnerability of the fleeing enemies was not exploited (Lazenby, “The Killing Zone” 101). Thus, casualty rates amongst hoplites seem relatively low. “It might be estimated that a phalanx might lose fifteen per cent of its strength, either through outright killing, death from wounds – typically brought on by peritonitis, following a penetration of the gut – or in the massacre which followed flight.” (Keegan, The History of Warfare 251)

Considering the harsh experiences of the hoplite (one can only imagine from the drawing at the left) and the interdependence of each man upon another inherent in phalanx battle, the pressing question of motivation arises. What kept men in line through such a horror? “Hoplites in nearly all city-states were deployed in their phalanxes by tribe, and most likely of course were well acquainted with those of their own town or deme”.(Hanson, The Western Way of War 151) In battle each man relied upon another; having a neighbor or relative be that person radically alters the situation a man is in. Intangibles such as trust have their place in warfare. Amongst strangers, a man is less prone to hide cowardice. However, the peer pressure brought about by placing a man among friends and family members raises a man’s pride. Fear of failure drives him. The sense that he faces danger with those he cares for gives him purpose. Xenophon, a Greek soldier and historian, remarked, “it has been seen, that a troop never be stronger than when it is formed of fellow-combatants that are friends,”. (Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.1.30) Fighting alongside friends made battle purposeful. One fought not only to protect an abstract notion such as freedom or liberty, but also to protect his friends and family. Thus, running away or breaking ranks meant desertion of those who he had grown up with. The success of the Theban Sacred Band takes this theory a step further. This successful group of one hundred and fifty homosexual lovers and beloved were garrisoned at the Theban Cadmeia under Pelopidas's command. It was said that their success derived from the intimate connection each felt with one another. Plutarch remarks: “Tribesmen or clansmen do not feel any great concern for their kinsfolk in time of danger,
but a band which is united with ties of love is truly indissoluble and unbreakable, since
both lovers and beloved are ashamed to be disgraced in the presence of the other, and each
stands his ground at a moment of danger to protect the other.”
(Plutarch, Pelopidas 18)

The crucial cohesion that decides battles was then dependent upon trust and pressure. While phalanx warfare tested a man’s nerve, he held his ground in fear of failure in the eyes of those he respected. He was also ashamed to leave those he cared for unprotected. The Sacred Band’s intimacy belittles common phalanx deployments by tribe by increasing the pressure each man felt to perform in the eyes of his lover. Thus, it comes as little surprise that the Sacred Band was undefeated from its conception in 375 BC to the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC.

This page draws largely from Victor Davis Hanson's The Western Way of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989. Other works referenced include: [Bullet Sample]John Lazenby's essay, "The Killing Zone", found in Hanson, V.D. (ed.) Hoplites: The Classical Battle Experience. London and New York: Routledge, 1991. [Bullet Sample]Keegan, John A History of Warfare. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. [Bullet Sample]Clausewitz, Carl Von On War. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976. [Bullet Sample]Plutarch's Lives of Aratus, Lycurgus, and Pelopidas [Bullet Sample]The War Songs of Tyrtaeus [Bullet Sample]Xenophon's Cyropaedia and Hellenica Sources "The Myth of the Hoplite's Hoplon," by J. F. Lazenby; David Whitehead. The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 1. (1996), pp. 27-33.

Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare," by Paul Cartledge. The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 97. (1977), pp. 11-27.