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De Natura Regis Regni Hierosylimae

The Kingdom of Jerusalem, and more specifically the King of Jerusalem, was quite an enigma. The position and country existed in a contradicting time of great change and greater dogma. The Crusades themselves were the backdrop of the Kingdom and they were such a mix of reality and ideas that the only possible outcome for the Kingdom of Jerusalem was to be just as perplexing as the pilgrimages themselves. It was once said that the Crusades were the sum total of medieval thought, and also the catalyst that eventually brought the medieval system crashing down.
The King of Jerusalem did not exist as an absolute monarch. Nor was he completely controlled by his noble peers. The King of Jerusalem, whose office started as a euphemism (Baron and Defender of the Holy Sepulcher), evolved into a blend of both the feudal and classical autocrat. This happened when the superimposed Western system of the ‘Franks’ was foisted upon the already well-ministered Palestine of the time. For, unlike the western Roman Empire, the east had fared relatively well in the last six and a half centuries since Rome’s fall. With the succession of first the Byzantines and then the Muslim rulers, the classical institutions of the cities and bureaucratic governments remained in place. Thus when the occidental institution of feudalism was brought in, the monarchy had to reorganize itself in order to survive.
In Europe, the seeds of change were already sprouting to bring an end to the feudal system. That is, the things which promote the healthy growth of economies which centered on active trade and currency were already being established (among these the foreign trade generated by the Crusades themselves). Additionally, the attempts of the Catholic Church to bring a more stable and peaceful Christendom about were paving the way for such stable political conditions to exist as to allow more organized government whose sole priority was no longer war, to come into being.
However, the governments and institutions were changing only gradually. The Crusaders and their brethren back home were completely unaware of the mutation. If some of them were suddenly transplanted to a foreign land and told to form a country and rule themselves, a traditional model would be their favored choice. Ignorant, as I have said, of changing conditions, these Crusaders would assume that the model ingrained into their thinking was the best suited for them, no matter where their lusts had taken them. In this case, the Levant. Thus, our Franks went into the Holy Land and set up a system based on theories of cooperation that they had grown up with in their home countries.
In the first place, the Crusades came upon the Holy Land with no more than the hearsay of their enemies and their institutions of government. Whether they expected to see oppressed Christians beneath oppressive Muslim overlords is near impossible to determine. But we can tell that when they did arrive, and incredibly managed to capture and hold some lands, they did not recognize the governments of the Muslims as worthwhile. Instead, they ridiculously opted to put the system developed to take over a rotten Europe from a trampled empire (i.e. post-Roman Europe) into a country that was far more efficiently governed before the Crusaders got there.
No matter the opinion the Crusaders had of the people they encountered, they entered and institutionalized their occupation on classic feudal theories. Firstly, when the great prize was taken -Jerusalem- the conquerors who had not yet succumbed to greed and established principalities along the road to the ancient city fell to the ancient method for ruling a country. They decided to choose a King. Noble Raymond opted not to offend God by becoming King of His city, where we see the nature of man in Godfrey, who became its custodian and king in all but name. From the time after him, the farce was dropped and King became the official title. Charles La Monte claims that this office operated in a strictly feudal manner from the beginning of its inception. He claims that even when it evolved into a almost continually hereditary office, it was always one based on election, something like the Holy Roman Emperor and his electors. This ties into his belief that the Haute Cour (High Court) was a strictly feudal body politic, which perpetually functioned in a classically feudal manner. That is, meeting randomly and at various places as military needs dictated, to solve matters of state among themselves with the King acting, as he says, as a mere president. The feudal primus inter pares.
The power of the High Court is considerable, but hardly insurmountable. The thought that the archaic ninth century feudal structure operated unflaggingly unto itself in the east, which La Monte claims, does not sit well. It is more likely that the environment in which it operated, one where war was a constant threat, not a fear, but an actual and true threat, provided it ample utility in its ancient mandate as an ad hoc war council. But as for normal civil administration, it is more likely that the local governments which had already been in place handled the bulk of these affairs. They may also account for what La Monte claims is a non-specification of duties within the Court. That is, back on the continent, governments were already beginning to specialize at the higher levels. La Monte himself writes that:

“In Jerusalem there never developed any differentiated bodies such as the Exchequer, King’s Bench, Common Pleas, Council, or Parliament of England; no Chambre des Comtes, Parlement, or Consiel du Roi as in France; no Diwans [sic] as in Sicily.” (La Monte 1932, 89)

The source for this, however, the Livre des Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois is surely not writing feudal law about those natives who are taking on roles that noble Frenchmen cannot concern themselves with, such as code enforcement. Their duties were of course omitted from the document. In other words, those parts of government that deal with the import of fresh water to a city, organizing the Kingdom’s treasury, mor than likely fall to those natives who would have had experience with such matters. Riley-Smith notes that these lower offices often fell to indigenous peoples. Not only were they more skilled in such matters, but were naturally the only people one could get in a land whose population was mostly not Frankish, nor even Christian. After all, the feudal establishments only catered to those who were Latin Christian. That is Roman Catholic. Thus they exclude a great deal of people and guaranteed for themselves the job of defending their kingdom. With their severely limited numbers, it is hardly surprising that this should have consumed nearly all of their time to the point at which they would hire on ‘outsiders’ to do the tedious business of governing for them.
When the task of governing the Holy Land was assumed by the Crusaders, the task was hardly manageable. The chroniclers of the Crusades claim hundreds of thousands of pilgrims fighting in this holy war, but the real figures are estimated closer to the 20,000 mark. And that was the original number. After Jerusalem was taken and the vows were fulfilled, the new Kings lost many faithful who returned to Europe and opted out of the land of milk and honey. In the end, the King of Jerusalem had a very limited military force at his disposal. The Muslim adversaries, however, were not limited by the same feudal tenets as to keep their forces down. So, invariably the Crusaders were outmatched numerically and, in time, had to call on the inhabitants of the country for military support.
The fact that these conscripts were drawn up does not in itself show a weakness in the monarchy. On the contrary, it shows power on its part. For by the act of summoning paid troops, the King shows he has the authority to do so. That is, he need not rely solely on the knights and other Frankish fighters. Often times, the full force of these was not as his disposal anyway, as feudal custom only forced the vassals to supply an agreed upon number of troops, which was not necessarily everything they had. When these natives were hired, they were under the military direction of the King and his appointed lieutenants. Obviously this circumscribed the power of leverage that the lesser vassals might have held over the King. Thus allowing him freedom to do as he pleased and not fear the appeasement of his peers in order to maintain his own position. Also, alliances made with certain other European groups, such as the Italian merchant communes within the cities (primarily coastal) were usually carried out under the auspices of the King. Thus making his authority that much more solid (as those who benefitted by him would certainly support him). By being the negotiator for the Kingdom, he naturally drew more finality to his own post. That is to say: the besant stopped with him.
There are traditionally two main camps that look at the feudal dynamic in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The first, older school, looked at the Livre des Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois and saw it as a literal constitution which was adhered to fervently. The last great advocate of this historiography was J. L. La Monte. He believes that the Kingdom of Jerusalem was a perfect feudal state. Run on the dictates that its founder in the First Crusade initially put forth. His assumptions leave much to faith, especially considering that he thinks the pure feudal system operated independently of its surroundings, and apparently never adapted in the slightest to the conditions in which it functioned (i.e. money-based economies and centralized government). He proposes as his crowning proof the Haute Cour, the High Court or Council of the King (from here called the ‘Court’). This body derived from the ancient feudal system of the chief and his top vassals -which were literally his equals that elected him- who counseled him. La Monte claims that the Court never strayed from its original purpose and never evolved into anything more than an informal, yet permanently existing, assemblage of nobles. Its origin lie naturally enough in the foundation of the Kingdom, where he claims no natural leader existed among them to whom they could all easily defer. The nobles banded together to elect one of their own as King. The Court was to be from thence forward the supreme body from which interpretation of law would be determined. It also functioned as a feudal court (as distinct from the courts that a commoner or other non-nobles would use), and as executives of the Kings wishes. All of this, though, was ratified by these nobles in a congress. The King could not summarily order the Court’s members and expect immediate obedience. The rules of the contract always applied.
La Monte quotes nicely: “‘quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem’...[was] not valid in the Latin crusading states.” This phrase means that what is pleasing to the King has the strength of law. He says that the powers granted to the Court were all-inclusive and primarily designed to check the monarch and make him subordinate to the wishes of the nobles in congress.
In his defense, he does allow that the Court did lose power starting with Fulk of Anjou. But as time progressed, the power was recouped by the barons and is evident in the election of Kings who were thenceforth always subject to the Court’s will. He cites the election of Baldwin V at the protests of her mother, Sibylle, as evidence. However he does not mention how this was achieved and to what purpose. Perhaps the nobles simply wanted a male on the throne. With the mores of the time, such a thing would not have required so much power to achieve.
Later, he shows that a couple of ‘liegemen’ and the King were all that was necessary to create what we would call a quorum and pass decisions that were binding. This represents the necessity of the King’s presence, as well as an apathy on the parts of other nobles to take part in the Court. This shows how impotent it became. Contrary to La Monte’s own opinion, which is that the nature of the Court was such that it could meet wherever it needed with whoever was at hand. La Monte himself states that rarely, though, did the full membership attend and no set group attended to business. Since there still remained a country to be run, and not even the powerful lordships of the realm bothered to present themselves, we have to assume that the operations of the country at large fell to the president of the court, namely the King. The differentiation of function that La Monte claims never occurred, more than likely was never necessary of the Court. For, back in Jerusalem, the King had his own attendants assisting him in such matters. The Court was for dealing with the troublesome archaic feudal obligation that had been established at the foundation of the Kingdom.
The next major work in this field was done by Jonathan Riley-Smith. In his book, The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, he posits more realistically that the monarchy of Jerusalem was ever evolving and changing along with the institutions under it, as one would expect from a country so diverse and constantly touched by external stimuli.
He attributes the founding of the new school to a few major predecessors, but culminates and refines their theory by showing how the legal documents that the earlier historians used (in particular La Monte) were in fact no more than what he calls a ‘caricature.’ A written code meant to represent an ideal, but was never able to be put into working affect. Palestine, says Riley-Smith, was a country already possessing a

‘developed administration, flourishing cities and a monetary economy. Palestinian feudalism was in fact inappropriate, corrupt, and characterized by a loose definition of terms...in a world so unlike their model they were self-consciously acting out parts based on cardboard exemplars of chivalry from Europe.” (Riley-Smith 1973, 4)

Riley-Smith notes additionally that the actual holders of offices were rarely Franks, for the most part, the administrators of the greater part of the kingdom were ‘sergeants,’ who while technically under the authority of the liegemen were actually operating in much the same way as they always had. This is shown to be a way in which the impracticality of the system was superimposed onto the Palestinian lands.
His argument is well researched, and is carried on by another named Stephen Tibble, to whom I owe the major credit for my own construction of the feudal system in Jerusalem. His book is clear and lucid, and shows the power of the monarchy in four rather closely related points. These all equal a sum total which says the Kingdom operated ‘fluidly,’ as he put it under the direction of the King who in effect controlled by force of rule the nobles which were causing him trouble. He claims the Kings held in their province the ability to take vassal fiefs into their own actual royal domain, create new lordships, retain lands in their private domain, and lastly and most ambiguously: the King could either retain or by splitting these fiefs limit the ability of the future holders of them to wield power over him. That is to say, once a fief was in the Kings control, he could divvy it up as he saw fit, and thus make it more or less useful to the new owner as his royal personage needed at any given time.
Tibble describes, quite obviously, how ‘reversion’ took place. Death, forcible removal (eviction?), or overt purchase. As I said, quite obvious ways in which the King could naturally come in to a fief. While this is not amazing in and of itself. We see that unlike La Monte, the Court is not present in any of this. By Tibble’s account, they would appear to be out of the picture. If they are, then the King does certainly appear to have held some great measure of authority. When the vassal fiefs could so be gotten by the throne and either used or reissued in a form more suitable to the Royal prerogative, it is readily apparent how the monarchy could benefit by this. In fact, I think it is definitely the reason it is Tibble’s first point. This would appear to be the strongest card the Defender of the Holy Sepulcher could play.
The second and third points are built on the first, so much so that the creation of new lordships is practically inclusive of the retention abilities of the King, as are the obvious economic benefits to the throne should he hold permanently lands which are profitable by either revenue or military complement (i.e. what troops are attached to that fief), so I will not dissect his argument of that point any farther.
The last argument Tibble puts out is also the last of the vague and obvious privileges that Royal dominion of the fiefs would posit by default. He calls it the deliberate limitation to the extent of the seigneuries.
Starting after his brief introduction of the arguments, we see numerous case studies of lordships which are examples of royal authority in Jerusalem. In Hebron, the fief was broken up to limit the authority of the lords; at Galilee, Tancred was denied coastal access, thus limiting the supplies his powerful and relatively large principality could gather; the three lordships of Toron, Banias and Chastel Neuf were kept permanently at odds (which according to Tibble was detrimental to the military capacity of the three). The case of Beirut is deftly shown to be the product of overactive imagination on the part of the historians. While it would appear to the reader that such a powerful fief as this surely would have proved a roadblock to royal ambition, Tibble claims that the large boundaries listed in many studies are not reflective of certain realities in the land. For instance, the King built a castle in land that has traditionally been considered part of the Lordship of Beirut. If this was the case, the King would have been overstepping his bounds according to the feudal system. Therefore, though we lack evidence, we can deduce that in fact Beirut was not so powerful as is imagined, and likely was subdivided into much more easily controlled territories. Possibly even so far as to be under direct rule of the King, through sergeants or maybe what are called money-fiefs. Money-fiefs were non-military fiefs of a more urban nature.
While Tibble grabs Riley-Smith’s theorem and runs a little far with it, he is not for that off the probable mark of the situation as it truly existed in the Holy Land at the time. The thought that the King sat in Jerusalem by the whim of a fabulous High Court based on post-Carolingian realities is absolutely ridiculous. Even more preposterous is the notion that the Kingdom could ever have been effectively administered in such a fashion in any case. Even had the system been truly established -with the King’s own compliance- to function in this manner, the simple fact remains that the feudal society automatically excluded those who were not already a part of it (namely the noble Crusaders) and thus had to rely on previously existing governing structures. When this happened, the figure of the King naturally became the head of a large pyramid structure of government. The nobles gradually would have devolved into military resources controlling lands as necessary to fulfill their contractual obligations, and nothing more. The authority they exerted over the King was limited to that which involved the archaic feudal systems which both sides, the throne and his ‘peers,’ had agreed would be allowed under the aegis of the Haute Cour. Matters of state naturally fell more and more to the King himself, who administered the functions of government outside the military necessities.

Bibliography:

Tibble, Steven. Monarchy and Lordships in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Suffolk, UK: Macmillan, 1973.

La Monte, John L. Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1932.

Riley-Smith, Jonathan. “Some Lesser Officials in Latin Syria.” English Historical Review 87 (Jan 1972): 1-26.