However, like most strong impressions in history, this one is clearer than the murky doings of Antonius' own time. There is a clear argument to be made that, not only was Antony not Caeasar's loyal lieutenant, but that he was, at best, aware of the murder plot and did nothing to save Caesar's life when, by doing so, he could have changed history in the West.

The first hint of this other, ominous Antonius comes from Plutarch's life of Caesar, in which one of the primary conspirators, Gaius Trebonius, and Antony had gone to greet Caesar in the fall of 45 BC, when he was returning from his triumphant victory in Spain against the remaining Pompeians. As Trebonius later tells Brutus and the conspirators,

...when they [the conspirators] were taking count of the friends whom they could trust for their enterprise, they raised a question about Antony. The rest were for making him one of them, but Trebonius opposed it. For, he said, while people were going out to meet Caesar on his return from Spain, Antony had travelled with him and shared his tent, and he had sounded him quietly and cautiously; Antony had understood him, he said, but had not responded to his advances; Antony had not, however, reported the conversation to Caesar, but had faithfully kept silence about it.
Plutarch, Life of Antony, 13.

Antony, keeping silent when he is approached to join a murderous conspiracy against Caesar? True, he had given his word - but was keeping his word more important than guarding Caesar's safety? This is the first crack in the conventional view of Antonius.

It is also important to remember the context of that journey to greet Caesar. All the sources agree that, after the Battle of Munda and Caesar's final victory in the Civil Wars, those who had formerly straddled the political fence agreed to throw in their political lots with Caesar, and Antony was one of many. Why did Antony not join Caesar in this vital battle - one that Caesar, by his own admission, very nearly lost? Because Antony was in the political dog-house with Caesar. Since his victory at Pharsalus in 48 BC, Caesar had given Antony opportunities to shine and, almost without exception, Antony had bungled them. Immediately after the Civil War began and intermittently during its long duration, Antony had been made responsible for the army and for Italy; his incapacity at political leadership led to bloodshed and scandal. As Plutarch notes, it was Antony and his extravagant, scandalous actions who dirtied Caesar's reputation for political leadership in the post-Rubicon period. Caesar at one point removed Antony from any significant command for almost two years. Thus it was Antony who was the supplicant in that voyage to greet Caesar. Sure enough, it worked; Antony was received back into Caesar's favor and was awarded the supreme position of Consul for 44 BC. Although Plutarch again notes, in discussing conspiracies against Caesar in his final months,

For we are told that when a certain man was accusing both of them to him, he said he had no fear of those fat and long-haired fellows [like Antonius and Dolabella], but rather of those pale and thin ones, indicating Brutus and Cassius, by whom he was to be conspired against and slain. Plutarch, Life of Antonius, 15.

If Antonius' loyalty was beyond question, why were men coming to Caesar with warnings that Antony was conspiring against him?

The infamous Lupercalia episode, in mid-February, 44 BC, is usually looked on as a 'setup' between Caesar and Antony, when Antony offered Caesar a diadem or crown three times, and three times Caesar refused it, thus showing the crowd that he did not want a crown. For someone as politically savvy as Caesar, thie episode has never rung true to me. It has always seemed odd that Caesar - so politically sophisticated - would pick such an obvious ploy to convey the idea that he did not seek to be King of Rome. However, if Antonius was working with the conspirators, not against them, this episode makes much more sense. Truly, then, it was Antonius' notion to stage the crown offer. Nothing could - and in fact, nothing did - upset the remaining oligarchs of the dead Republic than the idea that Caesar sought to be king. Coming only weeks after he had accepted the Senate's honor of becoming Dictator for Life in Rome, coupling that honor with the notion of a kingly crown was a political disaster in the making. Word flew around Rome; it is hard not to imagine that the number of committed conspirators increased. If Antony was acting as Caesar's friend, the results were the opposite of those he allegedly sought. However, if he were not Caesar's friend... Not only had Caesar, in the past, severely disciplined Antony, but his control of his administration was so strong that there was little to no hope that Antonius could rise above the position of Consul, scheduled in the very year of Caesar's murder. Caesar, in particular, had shown himself intolerant of Antony's need for money - he had caught Antony trying to finagle Pompeius' wondrous Roman villa without paying for it, and insisted that a fair price be paid. Antonius was always desperate for money, with his super-extravant lifestyle. He was not chosen to accompany Caesar to the war in Parthia, where fortunes could be easily made. He was under Caesar's ruthless eye, and as long as Caesar lived, Antonius' chances for further promotion, glory, and wealth would be limited by Caesar's controls.

In fact, in pondering the situation, Antony had every reason to wish Caesar out of the picture, as long as that left Antony atop the political heap. Which meant that Caesar's removal had to be accomplished, not only while Antony was Consul, but while Caesar was in Rome. The difficulties of travel and information made any action in Parthia too difficult to predict.

So Antony and the conspirators gave out the story that Antony was separated from Caesar's side on the Ides of March by the conspirators, who 'kept' him outside during the minutes when, scant paces away, Caesar was being cut to ribbons by dozens of men. All sources agree Antony did not enter the chamber until Caesar was dead, while others suggest that he fled the scene without making an entrance. Yet by that very night, Antony was negotiating with the conspirators. On March 18, in the famous meeting of the Senate in the Temple of Tellus, Antony - now supreme - did not demand vengeance for his dead leader. Instead, he astonished many by taking a line of conciliation with the murderers. Cicero tried to take credit for the notion that none of the "liberators" would be punished for their action, but most sources agree it was Antony - the last man to take Cicero's advice unless it were to his own advantage. And it would have been very much to his advantage if he had foreknowledge of the Ides of March, not to punish those who could reveal that fact, if they chose.

In fact, his conciliation of Caesar's murderers, in one way, was perhaps Antonius' greatest mistake. In the tsunami of rage and the quest for revenge swirling around the Ides of March by those who loved or supported Caesar, his 'statesmanlike' pose of forgiving the murderers in order to get Caesar's laws justified, struck an entirely false note. Antony was not known for his passive, statesmanlike behavior. It permitted the unknown Octavius, as Caesar's grand-nephew, to position himself as the avenger of Caesar and to get the support of entire legions who mourned their dead general. Antonius might have thought, given the number of aristocratic assassins involved, their political support would more than make up for his failure to stand as the adamant Caesarian. If so, he was wrong.

In the end, it was Octavius/Augustus who reaped the whirlwind of Caesarian loyalty, not Antonius. But, except for Cicero, Antonius' gamble could very well have replaced Caesar by himself at the head of the Roman state. It was a gamble that, without a couple of unforeseen quirks, might well have succeeded.